Kelly F. Pearson v. Kimberlee Y. Pearson : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Kelly F. Pearson v. Kimberlee Y. Pearson : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven H. Gunn; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee; Kellie F. Williams;
Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Intervenor/Appelleee.
Paige Bigelow; Kruse, Landa, Maycock & Ricks; Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Pearson v. Pearson, No. 20040677 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5159
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KELLY F. PEARSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
PETER D. THANOS, 
Intervenor/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040677-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STEVEN H.GUNN (1272) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS (3493) 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Intervenor / Appellee 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-1162 
PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS 
Attorney for Petitioner / Appellant 
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801) 531-7090 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE r 
JUN 1 5 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KELLY F. PEARSON, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
PETER D. THANOS, 
Intervenor/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040677-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STEVEN H.GUNN (1272) 
RAY.QUINNEY&NEBEKER 
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS (3493) 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Intervenor / Appellee 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-1162 
PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS 
Attorney for Petitioner / Appellant 
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801) 531-7090 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INTERVENOR STANDING TO 
DISESTABLISH PETITIONER AS ZACHARY'S LEGAL FATHER 1 
A. Schoolcraft Analysis 1 
B. Constitutional Analysis 8 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DOCTRINEOF 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE 14 
III. THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED 
AGAINST PETITIONER 20 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF CUSTODY RIGHTS IN NICHOLAS TO 
INTERVENOR WAS PLAIN ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED 21 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CUSTODY 22 
CONCLUSION 25 
ADDENDUM: Order on Motion to Intervene 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
B.H. v. K.D.. 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D. 1993) 6,7 
B.N.P. v. D.M.P.. 896 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) 11 
Beltran v. Allan. 926 P.2d 892, 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 21 
Crouse v. Crouse. 552 N.W. 2d 413 (S.D. 1996) 18 
Evans v. Bisson, 970 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1998) 3 
Ex parte CAP.. 683 So. 2d 1010 (Ala. 1996) 11 
Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989) 3,10,11,12,13 
Family Independence Agency v. Jefferson, 677 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004) 3 
Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App 291 14 
Fernandez v. McKenney. 776 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 3 
Foster v. Whitley. 564 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) 11 
Ghrist v. Fricks. 465 S.E. 2d 501, 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) 10 
Girard v. Waqenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1991) 3 
Hales v. Hales. 656 P.2d 423 (Utah 1982) 1 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) 6,19 
In re CAW. 665 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 2003) 3 
In re D.B.S.. 888 P.2d 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) 11 
InreJesusaV.. 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) 4,16 
iii 
In re Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) 4 
KristineH.v.LisaR., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 16 
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1987 14 
Lopes v. Lopes, 518 P.2d 687 (Utah 1974) 1 
Michael H.v.Gerald P., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) 12,13 
N.A.H.v.S.LS- 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000) 3 
Nancy S.v.MicheleG., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) 15 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1211-12 (Utah 1983) 21 
Nostrand v. Qlivieri, 427 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 3,10 
Parvzek v. Parvzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 24 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990) 21 
Soumis v. Soumis, 553 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) 18 
StateinreJ.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 1, 2,3,4, 5,6 
State v. Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997) 15 
Steven W. v. Matthew S., 33 Cal. App. 4* 1108.1116-17 (1995) 5 
Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 24 
Susan H.v. JackS., 30 Cal. App. 4«> 1435,1442-43 (1994) 5 
Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986) 1, 2 
Van v. Zahorik, 575 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) 16,17 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) 20 
iv 
Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700,707 (Utah 1985) 19 
Williamson v. Williamson. 1999 UT App 219.983 P.2d 1103 22 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10(1 )(a)(ii) 24 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45g-101 14,15,17 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-25-18 &-21) 2 
Other Authorities 
Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act as Last Amended in 2002 With Prefatory Note 
and Comments. 37 Fam. L Q. 5, 22 (2003) 17 
Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 5-148 (2nd ed. 2004) 4 
Ira Mark Ellman. Thinking about Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36 
Fam. L Q. 49, 51-55 (2002) 2, 3, 5,18 
Rules 
Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 14 
Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 14 
V 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INTERVENOR STANDING TO 
DISESTABLISH PETITIONER AS ZACHARY'S LEGAL FATHER 
A. Schoolcraft Analysis 
Intervenor and respondent assert that State in re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
("Schoolcraft") rr- • • i^oce v. leece, , 
1986) a> ' L^ -^v . Lopes, 518 P.2d 687 (Utah 1974). In fact there was no conflict in the 
holdings of these cases. Lopes adopts Lord Mansfield's rule, which simply bars testimony 
from parents that would illegitimize their child, while acknowledging that "p]n this case, as it 
seems would be true in practically all cases, there should be no difficulty in such 
indepenj»i:i ,,.-•„: .- I." Lopes, 518 P.2d at 691, n.5. In Teece, 
the trial * Mansfield's rule to deny a husband's request for 
blood tests. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, noting: "Nothing in [Lord Mansfield's] rule, 
which bars testimony from either parent that would illegitimize their child, prohibits the 
introduction of the results of blood or tissue typing tests or of witnesses other than the 
putative parents on the issue of paternity." Teece, 715 P.2d at 107 (citing Hales v. Hales. 
656 P ,M 4?'l (I II,ill l(>8?) (emphasis in original). 
As both the Teece court and the Lopes court recognized, by the time these cases 
were decided the advent of blood tests had changed the landscape with respect to 
parentage determinations, substantially eroding the practical effect of Lord Mansfield's rule. 
l 
Moreover, scientific advances in blood testing had been given legal effect by the enactment 
of sections 78-25-18 and -21 of the Utah Code, which mandated that courts use blood tests 
to assist in paternity determinations. See Teece, 715 P.2d at 107; Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d at 
714 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-25-18 & -21). 
It was in this context that the Utah Supreme Court decided Schoolcraft. The effect of 
the Schoolcraft decision was to affirm the continued importance of the policy considerations 
informing Lord Mansfield's rule and the presumption of legitimacy, despite advances in 
paternity testing in the century or more that these rules had been in place. In so doing, the 
Utah Supreme Court was in line with courts in other states which similarly recognized the 
need for legal principles to address complexities arising from social and scientific 
developments. See Ira Mark Ellman, Thinking about Custody and Support in Ambiguous-
Father Families, 36 Fam. L. Q. 49,51-55 (2002). These developments resulted in an 
increased need to assign legal paternity where there is knowledge of a divergence between 
social and biological paternity, jd. at 55. Professor Ellman states: "Legal paternity and 
biological paternity have never been identical. That was once inevitable; today it is a matter 
of choice. Particularly as policymakers have become more determined to enforce child 
support obligations, the choice becomes more important. Even though the law's historic 
emphasis on social paternity owed much to scientific ignorance, it often produced sensible 
results. Those results should not be displaced by our new-found ability to establish 
biological paternity." ]d. at 77. 
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That sentiment is echoed by the Michigan Supreme Court in In re CAW, 665 N.W.2d 
475 (Mich. 2003), in which the court held that a biological father did not have standing to 
intervene in a child protective proceeding in which the child involved had a legal father. The 
court stated: "There is much that benefits society and, in particular, the children <r n i ir 
state, by a legal regime that presumes the legitimacy of children born during a marriage." 
'eveloped ' question of legal 
paternity where the social father and the biological father are the not the same. "The key 
things we learn from all these cases... is that the rights and obligations of parentage 
appropriately arise from relationships, not just from biology." Ellman, supra, at 65. 
Schoolcraft, by application oi a standing analysu 
considerations protecting 
. . . . , — legal 
father may be contested, simply makes use of one such legal tool. Other states have also 
employed standing analyses, see, e.g., Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989); 
Nostrand v. Olivieri, 427 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Family Independence 
Agency v. Jefferson, 677 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004); Girard v. Wagenmaker, < 
372 (Mich. 1991); Evans v. Bissor. • - '"-' II 
evidentiary hearing be conducted prior to blood tests being ordered or considered or 
paternity being determined, see, e.g., N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000); Fernandez 
v. McKennev, 776 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), have weighed the competing 
interests at stake per their statutory schemes, see, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 
3 
2004) or have employed estoppel principles, see, e.g.. In re Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 
1028 (Or. Ct.App. 1996). 
While respondent and intervenor do not appear to contend that Schoolcraft was not 
an appropriate analytical tool to be applied in this case, they nevertheless argue that 
intervenor's affidavit, improperly filed August 1.2001, prior to intervener's motion to 
intervene having been granted and before he had been made a party the case, was 
admissible and conclusively proved that he was Zachary's father. The notion that a person, 
not a party to a case, may file blood tests with the court at any time and thereby establish 
paternity, runs directly counter to Schoolcraft. 
Respondent and intervenor also take issue with the concept that the policy of 
protecting marriage may have broader application than to the Pearsons marriage in 
particular, and that rules of law may promote - or not - the stability of marriage in general. 
Nevertheless, this concept is evident in our laws. An example is Rule 502 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, which protects spousal confidential communications after divorce, and even 
after death. See Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law. 5-148 (2nd ed. 
2004). The survival of the privilege, though a particular marriage has dissolved, 
encourages open communication between spouses in marriage in general, while having no 
positive benefit in application to the particular marriage that has already dissolved. 
Similarly, it is clear that the Pearsons marriage has dissolved. However, the stability 
of marriages in general, as distinct from the Pearsons marriage in particular, is promoted by 
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giving legal protection to parent-child relationships that develop within marriages, and 
ensuring that that legal protection survives subsequent separation or divorce. The 
dissolution of the marriage between the legal father and the mother "does not change the 
preferred principle, which is to preserve the child's relationship with the social father, if there 
is one." Ellman, supra, at 64; see also Susan H. v. Jack S., 30 Cal. App. 4th 1435,1442-43 
(1994) (Steven W.v.MatthewS.. 33 Cal. App. 4* 1108,1116-17 (1995) (holding that 
extant father-child relationship should be preserved at cost of biological ties, though 
presumed father's relationship with mother had ended). Petitioner merely urges that these 
broader implications are legitimately considered when analyzing the first policy 
consideration identified in Schoolcraft. 
In their focus on the fact that petitioner's marriage with respondent has dissolved, 
respondent and intervenor almost wholly fail to address the second policy consideration 
identified in Schoolcraft, that of protecting children from disruptive attacks on their paternity, 
except to note that Dr. Sanders opined that "[tjhere is no inherent reason why the presence 
of Mr. Thanos as another loving caretaker should have any further disruptive impact on 
Zachary's relationship with Mr. Pearson." Add, "D" to Brief of Appellees, at 2, fl 2. 
Reliance on this opinion of Dr. Sanders' in addressing the second policy 
consideration set forth in Schoolcraft is problematic for several reasons. First, Dr. Sanders 
has no credentials that qualify her to decide questions of public policy. Secondly, while 
there may be no "inherent reason" that the presence of intervenor in Zachary's life should 
5 
have any disruptive impact on Zachary's relationship with petitioner, the question that 
needed to be answered was whether intervener's presence in this case, for the express 
purpose of establishing himself as Zachary's legal father and terminating the legal 
relationship of father and child that existed to that time, would be disruptive to Zachary. It is 
impossible to reconcile the court's conclusion that it would not with Dr. Sanders' statement 
that "Zachary's emotional security would likely be significantly disrupted in the case of 
severely limited or complete loss of contact with Mr. Pearson," id. and the court's ultimate 
conclusion - stemming entirely from the court's prior standing determination - that petitioner 
must be deemed a "non-parent" to Zachary with no legal rights of custody vis-a-vis 
respondent due to the dictates of Hutchison. Finding No. 35. 
As the court finds, petitioner is Zachary's father "in real terms". Finding No. 35. The 
standing analysis of Schoolcraft provides a mechanism by which the courts can ensure that 
the individual who is a child's father "in real terms" is also identified as the child's father in 
legal terms, and that social and legal realities thus remain aligned. It should have been so 
employed by the trial court in this case. 
Respondent and intervenor place much emphasis on the fact that they subsequently 
married and formed an "intact family relationship", apparently contending that these facts 
should be determinative in the standing analysis. However, as the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota pointed out in B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D. 1993), "One must have standing 
6 
to commence an action One cannot commence an action without standing, based only 
on the hope that standing may later materialize." Id. at 375. 
Intervenor petitioned to intervene in the Pearsons divorce action in January 2001, 
when Zachary was 16 months old. He had extremely limited contact with Zachary to that 
point, had participated in keeping his parentage of Zachary secret, had not demonstrated a 
willingness to sacrifice his own interests for those of Zachary's, and had not developed a 
strong mutual bond with Zachary. Finding Nos. 6 & 35. These facts, as found by the court 
after trial, are exactly as Commissioner Evans found them to be at the initial standing 
hearing in August 2001. (R.671 & Add. "A"). 
Standing is not a moving target, but must be determined on the facts as they exist 
when the petition is commenced. Here, those facts properly led Commissioner Evans to 
conclude that intervener's "motion to intervene should be denied as Mr. Thanos lacks 
standing to challenge the presumption of paternity that exists in favor of Mr. Pearson as 
Zachary's father." Id. fl 5. Those facts are also what has resulted in the reality that existed 
at trial and continues to exist today, namely, that Zachary and Nicholas continue to view 
petitioner as their father and intervenor as their step-father. See Ex. I-2, at 3; Ex. I-4, at 3, 
R.2434, at 19, R. 2534, at 711:17, 715-16, R.2535, at 950. As much as intervenor and 
respondent may wish it to be otherwise, their formation of a "unitary family", after Zachary 
had already established parental ties with petitioner in the family into which he was born, 
does not result in those ties disappearing. Commissioner Evans' conclusion that intervenor 
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did not have standing to interefere with that established relationship should not have been 
overruled and should be reinstated now. 
B. Constitutional Analysis 
Respondent and intervenor do not present a substantive due process analysis in 
their brief, nor do they respond to petitioner's, except to attempt to distinguish some of the 
cases cited by petitioner. They make broad, sweeping statements without reference to 
constitutional analysis or legal authority of any kind, such as: "Controlling and 
constitutionally accepted authority supports the principle that in certain circumstances a 
biological parent's right is preeminent or has priority over that of a presumptive legal 
parent." Brief of Appellees, at 34. Such conclusory statements, without benefit of citation 
to which "controlling and constitutionally accepted authority" respondent and intervenor may 
have in mind, does not substitute for constitutional analysis. 
Nor does the trial court's adoption of Dr. Sanders' written opinion - which the trial 
court did not allow to be challenged nor contradictory evidence adduced to rebut - about 
the generic importance of biological relationships to children in general suffice as 
constitutional analysis. It should go without saying that Dr. Sanders is not qualified to weigh 
the rights and interests at stake in matters of constitutional dimension, nor are her 
unchallenged views regarding the importance of biology to children in general of any 
particular significance to that inquiry. 
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It is not incredible, but a simple fact that the trial court concluded without 
constitutional or statutory analysis of any kind, that "Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45a-
1, the Uniform Paternity Act, provides Peter Thanos with paternity rights which entitle him to 
intervention. Both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions grant Peter Thanos constitutional rights 
afforded to a natural parent." R.975, fl 23. The trial court's conclusions are erroneous for 
the reasons set forth in petitioner's opening brief. The trial court's flawed standing analysis 
flowed from these erroneous conclusions. 
The trial court's erroneous conclusion that intervenor had a constitutionally and 
statutorily protected right to establish his paternity of Zachary was made November 7,2002 
(R.975), over a year before the custody trial, which took place April 1, 2004 through April 8, 
2004 (R.2417-24). Therefore, it is inaccurate to claim, as petitioner and intervenor do, that 
petitioner was afforded due process when the trial court permitted intervenor standing to 
contest Zachary's paternity because "[t]he trial court heard many days of trial testimony, 
including the testimony of various expert witnesses regarding what was in the best interest 
of Zachary." Brief of Appellees, at 33. The issue at trial was custody, not paternity. 
Petitioner competed for custody of Zachary as a "non-parent" (Finding No. 35) because his 
status as Zachary's legal parent had previously been terminated without the benefit of a trial 
or evidentiary hearing of any kind, petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing having 
been summarily denied (R.869). 
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Respondent and intervener's response to petitioner's constitutional analysis again 
places much weight on the fact that they are now married, while petitioner and respondent's 
marriage has dissolved. They go so far as to apparently conclude that this is the single 
determinative factor, stating: "The trial court in the case at bar fully analyzed whether there 
was an intact marriage. It was not necessary for the court to extend the analysis beyond 
the finding that at the time of trial the Petitioner and Respondent were 'separated and later 
divorced.'" Brief of Appellees, at 40. 
It is no doubt true that the interests of the marital family are and should be 
constitutionally protected. As previously discussed, however, protections afforded the 
marital family survive the dissolution of the marriage. Thus, cases in which the biological 
father seeks to intervene as against husband and wife, who are aligned, appropriately 
emphasize the importance of the integrity of the marriage. However, cases in which the 
biological father and the mother are aligned against the husband also emphasize the 
importance of the marital family and the protection of parent-child relationships developed 
within it. See, e.g., Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989); Nostrand v. Olivieri, 427 
So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (remanding for determination of standing where 
mother and biological father, now married, petitioned to establish biological father's paternity 
of child born during mother's marriage to husband); Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E. 2d 501,506 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing trial court's declaration of biological father as child's legal 
father where mother and biological father, now married, petitioned to establish paternity in 
10 
biological father, stating: "[Pjublic policy will not permit a mother and an alleged father to 
enlist the aid of the courts to disturb the emotional ties existing between a child and his legal 
father after sitting on their rights for the first three years of the child's life."); InreP.B.S., 888 
P.2d 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's dismissal of paternity petition brought 
by biological father who was living with mother and had developed "parent-like" relationship 
with child born during mother's marriage to husband). 
Particular instructive, in light of petitioner and intervener's argument that the 
constitutional analysis, and apparently the standing analysis, turns entirely on the factual 
question.To whom is the mother currently married? is the case of Ex parte Presse, decided 
in 1989 by the Alabama Supreme Court and subsequently re-affirmed in several cases. 
See Foster v. Whitley, 564 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Ex parte CAP., 683 So. 2d 
1010 (Ala. 1996); B.N.P.v. D.M.P.. 896 So. 2d 503 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). 
In Ex Parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989), the husband and the mother were 
divorced when the child was approximately three years old. The mother married the 
biological father of the child two months later, and the mother and biological father 
subsequently filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment of paternity. Based on blood 
test results introduced into evidence, the trial court declared the biological father to be the 
child's father, ordered the birth certificate to be amended, and curtailed the husband's 
visitation privileges. Id. at 408. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 
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The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed. Recognizing that the biological father's 
claims were not barred by res judicata, though the mother's were, the court conducted 
statutory, policy, and constitutional analyses of these issues. The court stated: 
Being mindful that the UPA espouses principles that seek to protect the 
sanctity of family relationships by providing a comprehensive statutory 
network through which a child may enforce its right of support against the 
presumed father, and because in this case the presumed father ardently 
wishes to fulfill that objection, we are constrained to hold that [the husband's] 
presumption of fatherhood takes precedent over any presumption that [the 
biological father] might possess It is quite apparent that the public 
policy considerations causing Presse, the husband of the child's mother, to be 
considered as her father, are much weightier than any considerations causing 
the biological father (who years later married the child's mother and received 
the child into his home) to be considered a 'presumed father'. Thus, even if 
we accepted [the biological father's] argument that he literally fits within the 
category of 'presumed father', it is clear that that presumption in his favor 
would be transcended by the 'weightier' presumption in favor of [the 
husband] The presumption in favor of [the husband] is an ancient one, 
supported by logic, common sense, and justice. 
Id. at 412. 
The court went on to analyze the constitutional aspects of the case in view of 
Michael H. v. Gerald P., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), which at the time had been recently decided. 
The court stated: 
Admittedly, this case and the case of Michael H. v. Gerald P., supra, have some 
factual differences, notably the fact that Michael was not married to and living with 
the mother and child when he brought his suit seeking visitation rights. 
Nevertheless, the applicable rules of law are the same. In this case, as in Michael 
K, the legal question is whether a man has standing to bring an action seeking to 
declare a child illegitimate and to have himself declared the father of that child. This 
is not permitted under the UPA, as long as there is a presumed father, pursuant to § 
26-17-5(a)(1), who has not disclaimed his status as the child's father; consequently, 
another man, though he later marries the mother and lives with the mother and child, 
12 
has no standing to challenge the presumed paternity of that child. Put another way, 
so long as the presumed father persists in maintaining his parental status, not even 
the subsequent marriage of the child's mother to another man can create standing in 
the other man to challenge the presumed father's parental relationship. 
Id. at 417-18. 
In this case, like the Presse case, parent-child relationships were established during 
the Pearsons marriage, and those relationships persisted after the Pearson's separation 
and divorce. The fact that Mrs. Pearson became Mrs. Thanos, marrying the man with 
whom she procreated a child during her marriage to Mr. Pearson, is not conclusive of the 
inquiry as to whom the legal father of the child should be. The fact is that a family system 
exists in which Nicholas and Zachary view petitioner as their father, intervenor as their step-
father, and themselves as brothers. This fact flows from the family that these children 
experienced from the time that they were infants, in real terms. It has nothing to do with the 
lurid details of Zachary's conception. It was error for the trial court to elevate Zachary's 
conception over the reality of these children's family by allowing intervenor standing to sever 
the legal ties that had to that point protected the family. The error was of constitutional 
magnitude and should be reversed.1 
11t is instructive to note that the Uniform Parentage Act, enacted in Utah effective May 2, 
2005, permits only the mother and the presumed father of a child born during a marriage to 
raise the issue of paternity of the child. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607(1) (2005). If the 
mother seeks to contest paternity of the child, the Act places on her the burden of showing 
that it would be in the best interests of the child to disestablish the parent-child relationship 
between the presumed father and the child. Id. § 78-45g-607(1)(c). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DOCTRINEOF 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Respondent and intervenor apply an incorrect standard of review in their argument 
that the trial court "acted within its permissible discretion" in concluding that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of this case. The court denied petitioner's 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of equitable estoppel, though the facts as set 
forth in petitioner's statement of materials facts and supporting affidavit were not 
controverted by respondent and intervenor in their responsive memoranda pursuant to Rule 
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See R.1302, R.1570, R. 1376, R. 1427. 
The facts were thus deemed admitted for purposes of the motion. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(A); Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, ffl| 7-9, 77 P.3d 339, 341-42. Whether the 
trial court correctly applied legal principles to uncontroverted facts on a motion for summary 
judgment is purely a question of law, as to which the appellate court affords the trial court 
no deference. See Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Hence, there is no "permissible discretion", as respondent and intervenor contend. 
Nor is it accurate to state that Utah has not recognized the use of equitable estoppel 
in contested paternity cases. Utah has enacted the Uniform Parentage Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45g-101 et seq., effective May 2, 2005, which provides that the doctrine of 
estoppel is applicable in precisely the circumstances that pertain here, i.e., "[i]n a 
proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father." Id. § 78-45g-
608(1). The statutute states: 
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[T]he tribunal may disregard genetic test results that exclude the presumed or 
declarant father if the tribunal determines that: (a) the conduct of the mother or the 
presumed or declarant father estops that party from denying parentage; and (b) it 
would be inequitable to disrupt the father-child relationship between the child and the 
presumed or declarant father." 
Id. The Uniform Parentage Act does not overturn existing law. Rather, it simply clarifies 
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable in this particular legal situation. This is 
no substantive difference from the law as stated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997), namely, that "[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is 
simply stated, yet it is applicable to a wide variety of factual and legal situations." Id. 
Respondent and intervenor also argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel "should 
not be invoked against a natural parent for the purpose of awarding custody and visitation to 
a nonparent," Brief of Appellees, at 43, citing cases from Michigan and California in support 
of that proposition. This argument is not helpful to respondent and intervenor. This case 
does not involve a "nonparent" attempting to invoke estoppel against a natural parent. 
Petitioner was Zachary's legal parent when he filed his motion for summary judgment, and 
had been exercising joint custodial privileges as such pursuant to court order for nearly two 
years. Intervenor, on the other hand, was a "nonparent" when the motion was filed, having 
no legal relationship to Zachary at all prior to May 8, 2003, when the trial court entered its 
order establishing paternity of Zachary in intervenor. 
Thus, Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), a case 
involving a lesbian with no legal relationship to a child born to her partner, is not on point. It 
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has, in any case, been overruled both by case law and statute in California. See Kristine H. 
v- Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).2 In factual scenarios that are on point 
with this case, California jurisprudence has consistently recognized the paramount 
importance of persons in petitioner's position, as opposed to intervener's position, in cases 
involving competing paternity claims. See In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2,15 (Cal. 2204) 
(holding husband's presumptive father status outweighed biological father's presumptive 
father status and affirming juvenile court's reasoning that "[t]he state interests rest on the 
policy to preserve and protect developing parent/child relationships which give young 
children social and emotional strength and stability. This is more important than 
establishing biological ties."). 
The Michigan case cited by intervenor and respondent is even less helpful to their 
position and runs directly counter to it. In Van v. Zahorik, 575 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1997), the court reconfirmed the continued viability of the equitable parent doctrine, id. 569, 
as well as the continued viability of equitable estoppel, id. 571, as doctrines by which one 
who is not the biological parent of a child may be legally considered to be the parent of the 
child, but only in cases in which the parties are married and the husband is not the 
biological father of the child bom during the marriage. Stating, "[t]he public policy of this 
state favors the institution of marriage," id. at 569, the court declined to expand the 
2
 In re Marriage of Arenz-Roper is equally inapplicable and is an unpublished opinion that 
may not be cited or relied on by parties or courts. It should not have been used by 
respondent and intervenor as supportive authority of any kind. 
16 
doctrines to situations in which a man who was never married to the mother but cohabited 
with her subsequently request visitation rights with children born during the period of 
cohabitation that are not biologically his. 
Clearly, petitioner and respondent were married, not cohabitating, when Zachary 
was born, and petitioner is not requesting expansion of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to 
a cohabitating relationship. Van v. Zahorik does not support the argument that equitable 
estoppel should not have been applied here to bar intevenor's paternity claim. 
Respondent and intervenor next argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should 
not apply in this case because respondent knew that he was not Zachary's biological father. 
The husband's knowledge should not be a determinative factor, and contrary to respondent 
and intervener's contention, has generally not been. In the Comment to Section 608 of the 
Uniform Parentage Act, it is noted: 
The most common situation in which estoppel should be applied arises when a man 
knows that a child is not, or may not be, his genetic child, but the man has 
affirmatively accepted his role as child's father and both the mother and the child 
have relied on that acceptance. Similarly, the man may have relied on the mother's 
acceptance of him as the child's father, and the mother is then estopped to deny the 
man's presumed parentage. 
Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act as Last Amended in 2002 With Prefatory Note 
and Comments. 37 Fam. L. Q. 5, 22 (2003). Whether petitioner knew or did not know that 
he was the biological father of Zachary is irrelevant to Zachary's interests - which 
respondent and intervenor argue and petitioner agrees - should be paramount. Equitable 
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estoppel should not be narrowly circumscribed to focus on such factors, which make no 
difference to the child. 
This same argument was advanced by the mother in Soumis v. Soumis, 553 N.W.2d 
619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), who like respondent, attempted to extinguish her husband's 
parental rights in a child born during their marriage at divorce. She argued that the trial 
court erred in applying the equitable parent doctrine in favor of the husband because he 
knew before the child's birth that he might not be the father. Id. at 622. The Court of 
Appeals of Michigan disagreed, reasoning: "[T]here is no additional factor in the Atkinson 
test requiring that the husband have no knowledge of the fact that his paternity may be in 
question. Rather, the Atkinson test analogized the doctrine of equitable parent to that of 
equitable adoption. Clearly, in adoption cases, the adoptive parents know they are not the 
biological parents. Therefore, the established law is exactly the opposite of what defendant 
contends." Id.; see also Ellman, supra, at 61-62 (arguing that in applying estoppel principles 
in paternity cases, courts should not focus on factors irrelevant to the child's interests, "such 
as whether the husband knew that he was not the children's biological father when he 
treated them as his own."). 
Respondent and intervener's reliance on Crouse v. Crouse, 552 N.W. 2d 413 (S.D. 
1996), is misguided both factually and legally. Crouse did not involve a presumed father, 
but a stepfather who did not marry the child's mother until the child was 6 months old. 
Unlike Crouse, petitioner never stood in the shoes of step-father to Zachary, but only in the 
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shoes of father, from before his birth. Cf. Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700,707 (Utah 1985), 
Durham, J., dissenting (noting that the situation in which a man who knows he is not a 
child's biological father but marries the mother and "knowingly assumes the responsibility of 
acting as the child's father from birth is qualitatively different from the typical stepparent 
situation where a person, previously unknown to the child, enters the family relationship and 
offers support to the stepchildren. In the former situation, there is a greater potential for 
psychological bonding and financial reliance since the parent/child relationship begins prior 
to birth... . In essence, the act of marrying a pregnant woman is comparable to 
adoption."). 
Additionally, respondent did far more than merely "encourage a close relationship" 
between Zachary and petitioner, as established by the uncontested facts set forth in 
petitioner's fact statement and affidavit supporting his motion for summary judgment. See 
R.1570, R.1302. 
Finally, respondent and intervenor contend that the court's determination at the 
custody trial - made long after petitioner's parental rights had already been terminated -
was a best interests determination that should nullify the court's prior, erroneous conclusion 
that "the doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of this case." R.1723, at 
19, U 4. This argument fails. The court in fact made no best interests determination 
regarding Zachary, concluding instead that Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 
1982) mandated application of the parental presumption against petitioner. See Finding No. 
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35. This determination, in turn, flowed from the trial court's erroneous denial of petitioner's 
motion for summary judgment. A non-existent "best interests" finding cannot be used to 
bolster the court's estoppel ruling. 
The doctrine of estoppel in the paternity context is intended to, and does, further the 
best interests of children. It has long been recognized that it is in the best interests of 
children for the individuals who will function as their parents to be identified early on, and to 
ensure that, once identified, uninterrupted bonding takes place and is protected. See, e.g., 
Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). Applying estoppel to prevent the 
disruption of established parent-child relationships furthers those interests There is nothing 
germaine to Zachary's best interests - including speculation as to the future importance to 
Zachary of his biological connection with intervenor - that favors disrupting the established 
relationship between Zachary and petitioner. 
The trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment should be 
reversed, and intervenor and respondent should be estopped from asserting that petitioner 
is not Zachary's legal father. 
III. THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED 
AGAINST PETITIONER 
Respondent and intervenor argue, once again, that the trial court determined 
Zachary's custody based on a best interests analysis. This is simply not the case. The trial 
court's Finding No. 35 made quite clear that "[rjespondent benefits from the parental 
presumption on her claim for custody of Zachary against Petitioner." Finding No. 35. 
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It cannot be said that court's application of an erroneous analysis to the 
determination of custody is harmless error. It resulted in a custody determination that 
elevated respondent's custody claim over petitioner's. This is contrary to the best interests 
analysis, which subordinates both parents' interests to that of the child. The court's custody 
determinations are necessarily flawed as a result and should be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF CUSTODY RIGHTS IN NICHOLAS TO 
INTERVENOR WAS PLAIN ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED 
Respondent and intervenor argue that petitioner has failed to marshall the evidence 
supporting the trial court's award of custody rights in Nicholas to intervenor. Petitioner was 
not required to marshall the evidence because there was no evidence adduced on this 
issue. No evidence was adduced on this issue because it was never pleaded or otherwise 
raised by any party at any time. "It is well established that the law does not require litigants 
to do a futile or vain act." Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892, 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (Billings, 
J., dissenting). Clearly, marshalling non-existent evidence is a futile act. 
The trial court plainly erred in awarding custody rights in Nicholas to intervenor when 
that issue was not before the court. No after-the-fact attempt by respondent and intervenor 
to justify it remedies the problem. "In our judicial system . . . all parties are entitled to notice 
that a particular issue is being considered by a court and to an opportunity to present 
evidence and argument on that issue before decision. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734,743 
(Utah 1990) (citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1211-12 (Utah 1983)). That was 
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not done here. The trial court overstepped its bounds in awarding intervenor rights of 
custody in Nicholas that were never sought. The award should be reversed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CUSTODY 
Respondent and intervenor argue that petitioner has failed to marshall the evidence 
and that his attack on the trial court's findings of fact must therefore fail. Petitioner is not 
required to marshall the evidence where the legal, not factual, sufficiency of the findings is 
at issue. See Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983 P.2d 1103,1107 n.2 (1999). 
Petitioner contends that the findings of fact as framed by the trial court are legally 
insufficient to support its custody awards. Marshalling is therefore not required. 
Contrary to respondent and intervener's claim, the court did not find "consistent with 
Dr. Sanders' report" that if petitioner chooses to remain in Utah, he should be awarded more 
limited parent-time with Nicholas and Zachary. Such a recommendation is nowhere in Dr. 
Sanders' report, and such a finding is nowhere in the court's findings. Nowhere does the 
court find, even conclusorily, that it would be in the best interests of the children for their 
time with petitioner to be reduced below the parent-time schedule set forth in the court's 
findings, namely, 50/50 with Nicholas and somewhat less than that with Zachary. Instead, 
the court simply concludes, inconsistent with the parent-time schedule that it finds is in the 
best interests of the children, that respondent should be permitted to relocate the children to 
Oregon, several hundred miles from petitioner. 
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Respondent and intervenor misapprehend petitioner's argument with respect to the 
court's finding that the "three children should not be separated absent some compelling 
circumstances not present here. There is substantial benefit of keeping these siblings 
together." Finding No. 34.c. This finding is inconsistent with the court's parent-time award, 
which separates Nicholas and Zachary from each other for some time each month, though 
they had never before been separated at all. Thus, two of the siblings are not kept together. 
As to Madelaine, with whom the boys had never been together for more than half the time, 
the court increased Zachary's time with Madelaine, while keeping Nicholas's the same, the 
court did not keep Zachary and Madelaine together, but imposed on them a new 
togetherness that they had not previously experienced. 
Moreover, this finding does not support the trial court's conclusion that respondent 
should be permitted to relocate Nicholas and Zachary to Oregon. Dr. Jill Sanders testified 
unequivocally that Nicholas and Zachary's contact with Madeleine was not more significant 
to them than their contact with petitioner, R.2534,859:5-8. Permitting removal of the 
children from petitioner to support a relationship of less import to the children than their 
relationship with petitioner cannot be said to be in the children's best interests. 
Respondent and intervenor take issue with petitioner's argument that the trial court 
was required to make factual findings linking the factors deemed important in its best 
interests analysis to each of the parents, not just one, i.e., to conduct a comparative 
analysis of the factors identified. This is the law, as set forth in the appellate opinions of this 
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state. See.e.q.. Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922,925 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating appellate 
court must have supporting findings linking custody factors to the children's best interests 
and each parent's abilities to meet the children's needs) (emphasis added). The trial court's 
focus on respondent's ability to meet the children's needs, without comparing it with 
petitioner's ability to do so, was error. 
Respondent and intervener's argument that the trial court made "twelve full 
paragraphs of findings directly on point" to the issue of custody of Zachary misses the fact 
that no findings distinguished between Zachary and Nicholas, except as to the parental 
presumption. It therefore logically follows that if this court determines that the parental 
presumption was erroneously applied against petitioner in the custody determination, then 
there should be no distinction permitted between the boys in the parent-time schedule. 
Respondent and intervenor argue that it was optional for the court to address the 
factors identified by petitioner as key to properly determining custody in this case. Contrary 
to respondent and intervener's assertion, the court is statutorily required to consider which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
10(1)(a)(ii). 
Case law mandates consideration of other factors. This court has held that trial 
courts "must examine a child's need for stability." Parvzek v. Parvzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Especially where respondent made explicit her intention to relocate 
the children from petitioner and their home in the State of Utah, it was necessary for the 
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court to address the relative ability of the parties to provide continuity of environment and 
stability for the children. 
The court's finding that "it is not helpful to rely on historical issues" does not suffice 
as a finding on the "past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties", 
another statutorily mandated factor. This factor is particularly relevant in this case, where 
the custody evaluator has recommended that the parties and the children relocate from this 
state in part due to the stigma that she perceives may attach to Zachary from respondent 
and intervener's conduct during the Pearson's marriage. R.2535, at 881-82. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's determination that petitioner is not Zachary's father was error and 
should be reversed. That determination informed the trial court's custody determinations, 
which should also be reversed and a proper analysis conducted that focuses on factors 
relevant to the best interests of Nicholas and Zachary. 
DATED this l b day of June, 2005. 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P.O. Box45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
PAIGE BIGELOW 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KELLY F. PEARSON, ) 
ORDER ON MOTION 
Petitioner, ) TO INTERVENE 
vs. 
) 
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON, Civil No. 004907881 
) Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Respondent. Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
PETER THANOS'S motion to intervene came on regularly before the court on the 30th 
day of August, 2001, the Honorable Michael S. Evans, District Court Commissioner, presiding. 
Peter Thanos was present in person and represented by counsel, Kellie Williams. Petitioner was 
present in person, and represented by counsel, Paige Bigelow. Respondent was present in person 
and represented by counsel, Steven H. Gunn. The court heard the arguments and proffers of Mr. 
1 hanos and each of the parties, and reviewed the affidavits and memorandums submitted in 
support and opposition to the motion. Based thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court 
now makes and enters the following: 
'FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties, petitioner Kelly Pearson and respondent Kimberly Pearson were 
married on August 17, 1992. 
2. Their first son Nicholas was born on July 6, 1997. His paternity is not in dispute. 
3. In 1996, Mr. Thanos, a married man, began an intimate relationship with 
respondent, Mrs. Pearson. This relationship was hidden from Mr. Pearson and Mr. Thanos's 
wife, Mrs. Thanos, and ultimately resulted in the conception of the second child born during the 
Pearsons' marriage, Zachary Pearson. 
4. Mr. Thanos was aware of and believed that he was Zachary's natural father from 
January of 1999, soon after Zachary's conception. 
5. Zachary was born on September 14, 1999. Mr. and Mr. Pearson treated him as 
their son in all respects, making no distinction whatsoever between him and his elder brother, 
Nicholas. Zachary's birth certificate lists Mr. Pearson as Zachary's father. 
6. The Pearson's marriage was intact at the time of Zachary's birth and remained 
intact and continued as a stable relationship, at least from the child's perspective, until May of 
2000, at which time Zachary was approximately 7 1/2 months old. 
7. Mr. Thanos is the natural, biological father of Zachary. 
8. Petitioner Kelly Pearson is the presumptive and psychological father of Zachary. 
9. Though being aware of his biological relationship to Zachary from approximate!) 
January of 1999, Mr. Thanos did nothing to acknowledge his paternity for more than two years. 
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until as late as August of 2001. just prior to the hearing herein. With the exception of the parties 
herein, Mr. Thanos kept his biological connection to Zachary hidden from others, including his 
family members, and including his wife of twenty-six years. Despite his belief and knowledge 
that he was Zachary's natural father, Mr. Thanos allowed Zachary to be regarded in every way as 
Mr. Pearson's son and to become closely bonded with Mr. Pearson during critical stages of 
Zachary's development. 
10. Mr. Thanos has not had substantial contact with Zachary prior to the initiation of 
this action, and the contact he has had has been incidental to his continuing relationship with 
Mrs. Pearson. At all times, Mr. Thanos has continued to live in Oregon, whereas Zachary, 
Nicholas, and the Pearsons live in Utah. At no time has Mr. Thanos lived with Zachary, nor 
established a parent-child bond. Mr. Thanos is not a psychological parent to Zachary. Mr. 
Thanos's failure to act as a father to Zachary was due to his choice to remain with his wife in 
Oregon and to keep his affair with Mrs. Pearson, and his biological connection to Zachary, 
hidden from his wife. Mr. Thanos waited until his wife's death to initiate this proceeding. In 
reviewing the choices Mr. Thanos made, which the court acknowledges were difficult choices, 
the court finds that in each instance Mr. Thanos subordinated Zachary's best interest to what he 
believed to be his own best interest. 
11. The court has reviewed the affidavit of Dr. Denise Goldsmith, which outlines the 
stages of development of children from birth through the first, second, and third year of life. 
Zachan has now entered his third year of life. It is acknowledged that Mr. Thanos was 
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completely absent from his first year of life, was absent for the first half of his second year of 
life, and has had incidental contact during the second half of the second year of Zacharv's life 
During Mr. Thanos's absence Zachary has developed critical bonds with his primary caregivers, 
Mr and Mrs. Pearson, and the court finds that for Mr. Thanos to be permitted to establish his 
paternity of Zachary and to be introduced at this point as a father figure in Zachary's life would 
be immediately disruptive to the child's stability and in the long-term would be emotionally 
damaging to the child. 
The court makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The court concludes that the cases cited by Mr. Thanos and the parties are helpful, 
though not determinative, as they are factually distinguishable from this case The court finds 
that a particular distinction between this case and the cases cited is that Zachary has a brother, 
Nicholas, whose paternity is not in question, who is close in age to Zachary, and who Mr Thanos 
and the parties all acknowledge should not be separated from Zachary 
2. The court concludes that the cases are in agreement that biological status or legal 
status alone does not dictate a specific result in regard to who should be allowed to challenge a 
presumption of paternity, in this case, the presumption of paternity that is present in favor of Mr 
Pearson In re Michael H, the U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the constitutional rights of a 
biological father of a child born into wedlock, specificallv states that a biological link must be 
considered only when such a link is combined with a substantial parent-child relationship The 
Schoolcraft case talks specifically about standing and who should be allowed to challenge the 
presumption of paternity, in this matter in favor or Mr Pearson The case states that paramount 
consideration must be given not only to preserving the stability ot marriage, but also to ensuring 
that children are protected from disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity 
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3. The court concludes that the procedure that Mr. Thanos has chosen is not 
determinative of the result, and that the result would be the same whether Mr. Thanos chose to 
pursue his attempt to adjudicate his paternity of Zachary in a separate paternity action, or by 
seeking to intervene in the Pearson's divorce action as he has done. 
5. Applying the foregoing findings of fact to the principles of law as set forth herein, 
the court concludes that Peter Thanos's motion to intervene should be denied as Mr. Thanos 
lacks standing to challenge the presumption of paternity that exists in favor of Mr. Pearson as 
Zachary's father. » 
DATED this 11 day of fj Cf 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
RECOMMENDED BY: 
VW>jraO_>ju^A 
MICHAEL S. EVANS 
District Court Commissioner 
/Huk^y\ 
,ySZ±_j 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
STEVEN H. GUNN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KELLIE WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Peter Thanos 
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